In Plato’s dialogue known as Euthyphro we find Socrates on the porch of King Archon. Socrates is there because he is being accused, by a man named Meletus, of corrupting the youth of Athens and of manufacturing new gods. It is apparently a little bit before his time to appear in court and as he is waiting he meets Euthyphro coming out of the court. Euthyphro, as Socrates is quite surprised to hear, is in the process of bringing charges of murder against…his own father!
Euthyphro’s father had a slave who had, himself, murdered another man. Euthyphro’s father therefore bound the slave and left him in a ditch and sent to the authorities to advise him as to what should be done with the man. While waiting to receive word back about the course of action he should take the man died from exposure. Euthyphro’s father felt that as the man was a murderer there was no real harm done, rather, justice was accomplished. Euthyphro, however, believes that this was also murder and therefore his father must pay for his crime.
After all, that is what the gods require for piety’s sake. Right?
Euthyphro is quite certain that he knows exactly what the gods would want him to do, namely, prosecute his father for murder. Socrates, however, is less sure. What Socrates desires to know is how a person can know what is pious? What is the proper definition of piety?
In true Socratic style, by asking question after question, it becomes clear that Euthyphro’s confident assertion, that he knows exactly what pleases the gods, is unfounded. The definition of Piety offered by Euthyphro changes no less than five times during this very short conversation. Eventually, as is the case with so many of Socrates’ interlocutors, Euthyphro simply dismisses himself from the conversation on the pretense of having many things to do.
Probably the most important issue raised by Socrates in this dialogue is “whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.” Socrates is wont to point out, however, that the gods themselves often seem to disagree on important issues concerning matters of justice. Zeus, after all, opposed and deposed his father Cronos. Hera, according to the Greek poets, is often infuriated by Zeus’ unfaithfulness to her (as he has many affairs with mortal women).
This dilemma, and its implications, can be flushed out in the following manner:
Either something is holy because the gods love it or the gods love it because it is holy. If a thing is holy because the gods love it then what is holy appears to be arbitrary because the gods love different things. On the other hand, if the gods love something because it is holy then the standard of holiness is outside of the gods and they are themselves subject to it (which means they are not the final authority on what is good). Therefore holiness is either arbitrary or the gods are not the standard of holiness.1
Polytheism suffers for many reasons but this particular dilemma serves us well to show one of its major defects. A polytheistic worldview is ultimately unable to account for the good, for justice, for holiness. The will and whim of the gods provides no basis for morality. In fact if there is any objective morality in the world, true holiness, it must be over and above the gods and they are themselves to be judged by it.
Some think that Euthyphro’s dilemma is a problem given theism and not just polytheism. Some have argued that the God of the Bible is in the same hole as Zeus. They reason that if God is free to command as he will then he could command other than he does and therefore his commands are arbitrary. Likewise, if God is not free to command as he will then he is bound to something that is higher and greater than himself and therefore not really God.
This however betrays a central misunderstanding about the God of the Bible and his perfections. God does not make holiness, nor is God subservient to holiness, God is holy. The good and God are one and the same. God commands according to his own goodness and his own perfect nature. The standard is immutable (unchanging) because he is unchanging. It is not arbitrary because to be perfect in being, to have no accidents2 in God, is the exact opposite of arbitrariness. God does not look to something outside of himself to know what is good and God cannot command other than what he does command because he is good.
For some Christians this strikes a wrong chord, it must be admitted, because they define omnipotence as the ability to do “anything” and by this they mean even the absurd. But this is not how Scripture portrays God. In Leviticus 19:2 God says to his people “You shall be holy, for I Yahweh your God am holy.” God is identical to holiness. Such being the case God cannot be both holy and not holy. If your definition of omnipotence allows for God’s degradation from perfection then may I suggest you may be wrong? God cannot do evil or logically absurd things because it would make him imperfect.
So then, theism goes between the horns of Euthyphro’s dilemma in a way polytheism cannot. It locates holiness in God himself as a defining attribute of his nature.
But one might rightfully ask, then, are all forms of theism the same on this point? The answer is no. Classical theism, with which Christianity is perfectly consistent, is certainly able to avoid the horns of this dilemma by offering a third option which avoids the undesirable consequences. Arguably there are other forms of theism which may paint a picture of God as more capricious or able to do things contrary to perfection. But even if we are generous enough to credit all other forms of theism the ability to go between these horns also, even still Christianity has the leading edge.
Why? Because the true God, the God presented to us in the Bible, is a Trinity. One being in three co-eternal and co-equal persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. What this means is that since God is truly one, Christian theism not only avoids the folly of polytheism and allows us to provide an answer to this dilemma but, also, God from eternity has had the ability to practice holiness, justice, love, etc., in perfect community within himself. God had no lack or need for man in order to display his holiness or show his goodness. All other forms of theism require God’s act of creation so that God might demonstrate his attributes. One could argue this means that other forms of theism manifest a deficiency in God that Christian theism avoids.
So Rock, Paper, Scissors… or shall I say: Polytheism, Theism, Christian Theism? Only in this game Christian Theism always wins.
For all you logic junkies, we can symbolize the argument as follows:
(H ⊃ A) ᐧ (L ⊃ O)
H v L
∴ A v O
This is a Valid Constructive Dilemma
To speak of “accidents” here is to refer to having a quality or attribute that is not necessary. No quality of God is an accident because they are essential to his nature. Blonde hair instead of brown is an “accident” in this since because it could be otherwise. Essential to humanness, though, is that they are image bearers or mammals, because they cannot be human and not have those qualities.
So well put, thank you!